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Abstract 
 
Confabulations offer unique opportunities for establishing the neurobiological basis of 
delusional thinking. As regards causal factors, a review of the confabulation literature 
suggests that neither amnesia nor executive impairment can be the sole (or perhaps 
even the primary) cause of all delusional beliefs – though they may act in concert with 
other factors. A key perspective in the modern literature is that many delusions have 
an emotionally positive or ‘wishful’ element, that may serve to modulate or manage 
emotional experience. Some authors have referred to this perspective as the ‘emotion 
dysregulation' hypothesis. In this article we review the theoretical underpinnings of 
this approach, and develop the idea by suggesting that the positive aspects of 
confabulatory states may have a role in perpetuating the imbalance between cognitive 
control and emotion. We draw on existing evidence from fields outside 
neuropsychology, to argue for three main causal factors: that positive emotions are 
related to more global or schematic forms of cognitive processing; that positive 
emotions influence the accuracy of memory recollection; and that positive emotions 
make people more susceptible to false memories. These findings suggest that the 
emotions that we want to feel (or do not want to feel) can influence the way we 
reconstruct past experiences and generate a sense of self – a proposition that bears on 
a unified theory of delusional belief states. 
 
 
 Keywords: memory; motivation; emotion; emotion regulation; executive function 
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‘The patient suffers from defect of memory, and is incapable of 
sustained intellectual exertion. He is ‘more emotional’ (really 
there is here a loss or defect of the highest [“finest”] with 
increased manifestation of the lower [“coarser”] emotions)’ 
H. Jackson, 1888, Remarks on the diagnosis and treatment of 
diseases of the brain 
 
 
1. Confabulation: a unique opportunity? 
Confabulation offers some unique opportunities for establishing the neurobiological 
basis of false or irrational beliefs. Unlike other classes of delusional belief, 
confabulations present a huge advantage in identifying a focal lesion site, in a patient 
who was pre-morbidly normal – an advantage not available to those studying false 
beliefs in either the neurologically normal, or the psychiatric population.    
 
A key element in some confabulations of neurological patients has been their 
relatively stable yet extreme nature. The patients hold opinions about the world that 
are manifestly incorrect, and yet are held by the patient to be true in spite of clearly 
presented evidence to the contrary, and have long been recognised as being 
scientifically important. The phenomenon was comprehensively described for the first 
time by Korsakoff (1889/1996), in the context of a dense amnesic syndrome (though 
they need not be related, as discussed below). The disorder is also seen in a variety of 
other pathologies, such as cerebrovascular accidents (most prominently those 
involving the anterior cerebral artery), traumatic brain injury, and dementia (Dalla 
Barba, 1993; DeLuca, 2000a; DeLuca & Diamond, 1995; Downes & Mayes, 1995; 
Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000; Luria, 1976; Moscovitch & Melo, 1997; Nahum et al, 
2012; Schnider et al, 1996); Solms, 1998; Talland, 1961). This review will focus on 
confabulation following focal brain lesion, where it appears to be more frequently 
observed, and is more severe, particularly after lesions that involve the medial and 
ventral surfaces of the frontal lobe. 
 
 
2. Confabulation as secondary to amnesia 
Confabulation has been defined in various ways over the years. The classic 
explanation of the disorder, following ideas from Bonhoffer (1901), suggests that 
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confabulation is secondary to amnesia, and it somehow represents ‘gap-filling’ 
motivated by embarrassment. De Luca (2000, pp.125-126) for example, claims that 
all cases of confabulation after ventromesial frontal lesions appear to show a degree 
of recent memory impairment. Related to this is the claim by Schnider and 
colleagues (Schnider, 2003; Schnider & Ptak, 1999; Schnider et al, 2002) that “the 
stories [of confabulating patients] can virtually always be traced back to elements 
of real events”, so that the disorder perhaps relates to some sort of suppression 
mechanism, whose failure is associated with confabulation, where the patient may 
be unable to tag the difference between a memory of a true event and the memory 
of a thought or imagined experience (Schnider et al, 2002, p. 59). This gap-filling 
argument may well apply to some classes of confabulation (especially of the 
‘momentary confabulation’ type, see Nahum et al, 2012).  
 
However, there have been problems with the ‘amnesia’ account (see Fotopoulou, 
Solms & Turnbull, 2004 for review), and the gap-filling model remains problematic in 
several ways. Dalla Barba (2002), for example, has noted that amnesic patients that 
confabulate often present a preserved capacity to move forward and backward in time, 
and that confabulation can be better conceptualized as a positive symptom, where 
temporal consciousness interacts with inappropriate information. Another argument 
against the amnesic account is that there are many patients with amnesia (even after 
ventromesial frontal lesion) who are not confabulatory. For example, it has long been 
noted that, while confabulation is common in the acute stages of a Korsakoff 
psychosis, it recovers in the chronic period, leaving a non-confabulatory amnesia (see 
DeLuca, 2000 for review). The opposite dissociation is also true: there are reports of 
confabulation without serious memory impairment. The Burgess & McNeil (1999) 
patient [BE], for example, had relatively minor memory impairment. BE’s 
anterograde memory test performance was at the lower end of the normal range, and 
he was described as “not clinically amnesic” (Burgess & McNeil, 1999, p.173).  
 
One might be best conclude that memory impairment is a common presenting feature 
of many or most patients with confabulation, and that amnesia often plays a central 
role. However, the instances of double dissociation between confabulation and 
amnesia suggest that it cannot always be the sole (or at times even the primary) cause 
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of the delusional belief. Indeed, memory impairment will be the first of several 
psychological processes in this review which we suggest represents a multi-factorial 
pattern of causes. 
 
 
 
3. Confabulation as secondary to executive impairment  
 
A second class of explanatory account for confabulation relates to one or other aspect 
of impairment in executive ability (Baddeley & Wilson, 1986; Benson, Djenderedjian, 
Miller, Pachana, Chang, Itti, & Mena, 1996; Kapur & Couchlan, 1980; Papagno & 
Baddeley, 1997; Stuss, Alexander, Lieberman, & Levine, 1978). This includes 
abilities such as source monitoring (Johnson, 1991; Johnson, 1997) or the control of 
memory systems (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Moscovitch, 1989; Schacter, Norman & 
Koutstaal, 1998). 
 
The dysexecutive class of argument again appears plausible, especially because a 
frontal lesion site is common in confabulation. In addition, a few investigations have 
revealed that the severity of confabulation appears to improve as measures of 
executive function recover, even though the severity of amnesia remains constant 
(Cunningham et al, 1997; Kapur & Coughlan, 1980; Papagno & Baddeley, 1997). For 
these reasons, the literature has long regarded impairments of executive function as 
being at the core of confabulations (Baddeley & Wilson, 1986; Benson, 
Djenderedjian, Miller, et al., 1996; Kapur & Couchlan, 1980; Papagno & Baddeley, 
1997; Stuss, Alexander, Lieberman, & Levine, 1978).  
 
However, the dysexecutive account is open to the same classes of criticism that might 
be applied to amnesia. At least a single dissociation between confabulation and 
executive impairment has been reported, noting that patients can have substantial 
impairments of executive function without becoming confabulatory (see Solms & 
Turnbull, 2007, p1085 for review). Indeed, neurological and neurosurgical wards 
contain thousands of patients with substantial impairments of executive functions, of 
various types, but almost none of them are confabulatory – indeed, while disorganised 
thinking is common in dysexecutive patients, confabulation is actually rather rare.  
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A related criticism of the dysexecutive account is that the narrowness of content of 
confabulation, which is often rather selective in its nature (see below). Thus, when 
one speaks to a patient who confabulates, they are typically sensible on most topics, 
but have small corners of their mental life, often associated with family or work 
issues, in which they suddenly become rather delusional, (notable examples are 
Burgess & McNeil, 1999; Conway & Tacchi, 1996; Villiers, Zent, Eastman, & 
Swingler, 1996). One interesting case is Burgess and McNeil’s (1999) report of a 
patient who confabulated in a single domain. His sole confabulation was that he 
would dress in formal clothes, several times a day, in the face of his wife’s protests 
(though he never actually left the house because he was inevitably faced with 
knowing where he was to go, which in his amnesia he could never recall, p.166). In 
contrast to this highly specific false belief, he remained lucid and sensible on a wide 
range of other topics, and showed no other instances of false belief. According to a 
dysexecutive account, such a patient might well produce false beliefs across all (or at 
least a very wide range) of domains. For these reasons the dysexecutive account has 
been argued to represent “too much of an explanation for the syndrome” (Kinsbourne, 
2000, p.158, emphasis added), in that it predicts a more diverse set of deficits than the 
patients actually produce. 
 
In response to these difficulties, some authors have suggested that both an amnesic 
and a dysexecutive disorder are necessary to invoke a confabulatory state (De Luca, 
2000) – a plausible argument, but one that opens the door for other explanatory 
variables beyond the realm of cognitive impairment.  
 
 
4. From motivational influences to the emotion dysregulation hypothesis 
 
One challenge facing both accounts of confabulation reviewed above is the content of 
confabulations. One way of addressing this is to ask why these patients confabulate on 
the specific occasions that they do - i.e. the issue of the specificity, or the selectivity, 
of confabulations. For many years, this important question was not a substantive issue 
in the literature. Remarkably, less than 20 years ago, Burgess and Mc Neil (1999) 
knew of “no formal empirical investigation of this dimension” (p.164), though their 
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clinical experience, and their knowledge of the literature, suggested that the content 
often reflected “the personal concerns, experiences and predilections” of the patient 
(p.164), a theme which we will explore in more detail below. This is now a much 
more closely investigated topic. 
 
What then of the “personal concerns, experiences and predilections” of the Burgess 
and Mc Neil (1999) patient described above? His pre-morbid occupation was as a 
shopkeeper, punctuated by occasional activities in a more formal role as an Inspector, 
where he had a supervisory role (and hierarchically dominant) position judging the 
performance of other shopkeepers – a position he enjoyed. Thus, his confabulation of 
dressing in formal clothes is represents a potential return to a position of some 
influence and authority, which he had now lost as a result of his brain injury. In other, 
less emotionally important, domains of his life, he showed no features of delusional 
belief. Thus, his confabulation appears to represents an attempt to sustain an 
emotionally important aspect of his self-identity.  
 
Thus, the delusional beliefs of the case placed the patient in a more positive life-
setting than his circumstances would otherwise have located him. This motivational 
aspect of confabulation has long been reported at an anecdotal level. That is, 
confabulations might involve ‘some kernels of truth of genuine experience’ 
(Talland, 1961) re-cast to place the patient in a more positive light (Mercer, 
Wapner, Gardner & Benson, 1977). This includes the suggestion that there is a 
fantasy, or a ‘wish-fulfilment’ element to the delusional belief (Betlheim & 
Hartmann, 1951; Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000; Turnbull, Berry, & Evans, 2003; 
Villiers, Zent, Eastman, Swingler, 1996). In many cases, this modification allows 
the patient to avoid negative emotions, such as anxiety or a sense of loss (Conway 
& Tacchi, 1996; Lidz, 1942; Weinstein, Kahn & Malitz, 1956). At other times, the 
delusions are frankly grandiose (Berlyne, 1972; Moscovitch, 1989; Sabhesan & 
Natarajan, 1988; Weistein & Kahn, 1955). This earlier literature also suggested that 
the content might be influenced by pre-morbid personality traits (Gainotti, 1981; 
Moll, 1915; Moscovitch, 1989; Talland, 1961, Weinstein, 1996; Whitlock, 1981; 
Williams & Rupp, 1938).  
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One perspective on these ‘wishful’ delusions is that they serve to modulate emotional 
experience, or perhaps to shape the emotional consequences of ideas. In an extension 
of the argument suggested by Burgess and McNeil (1999, p.164), Kinsbourne (2000) 
pointed out that a clear contributory factor to confabulation is “the affective 
significance of the topic about which the patient confabulates. Patients mostly 
confabulate about personal matters that are emotionally significant to them, such as 
the integrity of their body... their prospects of recovering, and for reassuming their 
prior lifestyle and employment” (Kinsbourne, 2000, p.158). Similarly, Paterson & 
1Zangwill (1944) had described patients who held false beliefs about place as showing 
that “a strong desire was actively inhibiting the cognitive mechanisms which normally 
subserve orientation” (p.67, emphasis added) – suggesting the very interesting idea 
that emotion or motivational factors might distort the execution of otherwise normal 
cognitive operations. However, while these ideas had often been raised, the issue was 
not systematically investigated until the last decade.  
 
In a series of papers, several researchers have attempted to investigate this issue 
empirically, demonstrating a number of key findings. Firstly, the false belief scenarios 
of confabulatory patients have a clear positive emotional bias, tending to be more 
pleasant than their actual circumstances 2. The initial investigations addressed an 
unselected sample of confabulations, and found positive transformations in roughly 
80% of instances (Fotopoulou et al, 2004), and far greater than the rate of (pseudo-
confabulation) control conditions (c.f. Bajo, Fleminger & Kopelman, 2010). Notably, 
when the variance was narrowed to consider confabulations about place, rather than 
person, this positive bias was again replicated (Turnbull, Berry & Evans, 2004). One 
substantial fraction of this group go to very ‘exotic’ locations, such as a bistro in the 
South of France, or a ferry in the Caribbean. The other class of confabulators go to 
                                                 
 
2
 In making this claim of positive bias, we are aware that not all confabulations are 
positive (e.g. Nahum et al., 2010, 2012; Schnider et al, 1996). We have wondered 
about why our studies did not always conform with other reports on the question of 
emotional valence. One factor may be that many of the cases of negative 
confabulations appear to come from patients with temporal lobe lesions (including 
amygdala involvement), whereas our patients have tended to have medial frontal 
lesion sites.  
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‘safe’ locations, such as their home, their parent’s home, or their old university3. The 
sorts of predisposition that might predict this choice is incompletely understood (for a 
review see Fotopolou, 2009) but is clearly an interesting issue for future research. A 
further key finding was that the confabulating patients tend to show a clear selective 
bias in the specific circumstances of their delusional misrememberings (Fotopoulou et 
al, 2008, Turnbull, Berry & Evans, 2004) – in that they are directed towards self 
(rather than towards others), and occur when only for negative (rather than positive) 
false beliefs. In other words, they show a self-protective (or defensive) function.  
 
There is a newer experimental literature that has challenged the positive bias 
hypothesis. Using EEG, Liverani and colleagues (2016) explored the effects of 
emotional manipulation (positive versus neutral IAPS images) on a task designed to 
investigate “reality filtering” as a putative mechanism of confabulation, on a group of 
neurologically normal individuals. Their main finding was that “orbitofrontal reality 
filtering” (the ability to place oneself correctly in time and space) is not influenced by 
the emotional valence of the processed material, thus contesting the positive bias 
hypothesis. Clearly, these emerging results contribute to the ongoing debate of the 
role that emotion may have on the generation of confabulation. They need to be 
considered, however, with caution since the performance of normotypical individuals 
cannot be directly extrapolated to brain injured populations. Some form of replication 
and extension seems appropriate, using confabulating patients (of the sort that our 
paper reviews) as experimental subjects. In addition, the material used to elicit 
emotional states in this study were IAPS pictures, a type of emotional stimulus which 
has been contested in terms of ecological validity compared to other methods (film 
clips, autobiographical recall etc, Coan & Allen, 2007). This may be an important 
issue, particularly when considering that several authors have stressed the fact that 
confabulations are strongly linked to personally relevant emotional events (see Salas 
et al 2011, 2015). 
                                                 
3
 Using the taxonomy proposed by Nahum et al., (2012) these types of confabulation 
are perhaps best categorized as ‘fantastic’, since they refer to implausible experiences 
that are incompatible with common notions of reality. The ‘fantastic’ nature of these 
confabulations, or their incompatibility with reality, has been described by Solms 
(2000) as characterized by features such as exemption from mutual contradiction  and 
the replacement of external reality by psychical reality.  
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In sum, recent theoretical accounts, which emphasize the relevance of motivational 
influences in confabulation, have stressed the need to generate ‘combined’ models 
where multiple contributing factors (cognitive impairment, emotion, premorbid 
personality, etc.) are considered (for a review see Fotopolou, 2009). These accounts 
are interesting, since they explain confabulation as the product of a dysregulation 
between top-down cognitive control processes (memory retrieval, inhibition) and 
bottom up emotive influences (Conway, 2005, Fotopolou 2009, 2010; Turnbull, 
Evans & Owen, 2005). Betlheim and Hartman (1924), for example, while describing 
Korsakoff patients, speak of a lack of cognitive restraint, which allows the normally 
implicit effect of primitive, emotion-based forms of cognition to become more 
explicit and colour recollection. More recently, Solms (2000) proposed that 
confabulations result from the combined effect of executive impairment, altered 
memory recollection and the release of deeper, and normally inhibited, cognitive 
modes. On a similar theme, Fotopolou and colleagues (2008) have viewed 
confabulation as a deficit in the control and regulation of memory retrieval, which 
allows motivational factors to acquire a greater role than usual in determining which 
memories are selected for retrieval and accepted as true (p. 1438). The key point here, 
for authors adhering to the emotion dysregulation hypothesis, is that the lack of 
cognitive regulation allows a disproportionately positive image of the self (rather than 
the ‘actual’ self) influences the memory reconstruction process more heavily (Conway 
and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Fotopolou, 2009, 2010) 
 
 
5. Exploring the cognitive control-emotion interaction 
Compared to the ‘cognitive’ and ‘motivational’ accounts, an emotion regulation 
model is perhaps better suited to explain the complex interplay between negative 
(cognitive impairment) and positive (emotion enhancement) symptoms, as well as 
secondary reactions to the illness, such as denial and compensatory efforts to sustain a 
positive image of the self. Nevertheless, beyond the point of suggesting an emotion 
regulation hypothesis, there has been little elaboration from authors regarding the 
nature of this process. This is surprising, considering that emotion dysregulation has 
been historically described as a core feature of brain injury (Ben-Yishai & Diller, 
2011; Goldstein, 1965 [1995]; Klonoff, Lage & Chiapello, 1993; Salas, 2012) and that 
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outside the field of neuropsychology there is a vast experimental literature looking at 
the neural basis and neuropsychological correlates of emotion regulation (for reviews 
see Gross, 2014, 2015). As a consequence, it seems timely to bring together these 
separate fields, to theoretically justify this hypothesis and begin to delineate potential 
ways in which it can be experimentally tested.  
 
What, then, is the place of emotion regulation in neuropsychology? While it has not 
always been labelled in this way, there are many historic descriptions of emotion 
dysregulation after brain damage, all of them emphasizing a (hierarchical) disruption 
in the balance between cognitive control and emotion. Amongst the more commonly 
cited is the 1868 observation by Harlow of Phineas Gage: ‘that the equilibrium or 
balance (so to speak) between his intellectual abilities and his animal propensities, 
seems to have been destroyed (p. 277). A few decades later, Hughlings Jackson 
(quoted at the start of the paper) referred to the same phenomenon, and similar 
arguments were presented by Kurt Goldstein in his famous case, Lanutti (Hanfmann, 
Rickers-Ovsiankina & Goldstein, 1944). We do not suggest, of course, that these 
failures of emotion regulation lead to confabulation. Phineas Gage was not (to the 
best of our knowledge) confabulatory. However, this literature does remind us that 
emotion has long been understood, at least anecdotally at first, as playing an 
important role in several aspects of mental life, including in several previously 
regarded as strictly cognitive. 
 
Evidence from contemporary neuropsychology has supported these early descriptions, 
suggesting that damage to the frontal lobes, and its cognitive control functions, can 
alter the ability to shape the influence that emotion has on behaviour and cognition. 
Most of the existing studies on this topic have explored how damage to ventromedial 
areas of the PFC can trigger an ‘imbalanced activity within the impulsive and 
reflective neural systems’ (Bechara, 2004, p. 176), where emotional decision making 
(Bechara, Tranel & Damasio, 2000; Damasio, 1994) and emotional and social 
behaviour become markedly compromised (Beer et al., 2003, 2006). More recently, a 
handful of articles have explored how damage to more lateral areas of the PFC can 
also modify the balance between cognition and emotion (Salas et al., 2013, 2014), 
consistent with group studies reporting ‘exaggerated’ emotional reactivity to negative 
(sad) stimuli after damage to the left PFC (Gillihan et al., 2010). Damage to the right 
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PFC also appears to compromise the regulation of emotions. Salas et al (2016) 
demonstrate this in individuals with unilateral focal lesions to the right PFC, 
confirmed by functional imaging work (Falquez et al, 2014). 
 
Taken together, the emergent neuroanatomical evidence from studies with brain 
injured patients offers promising support for the emotion dysregulation hypothesis: 
when ventral or lateral portions of the frontal lobes are damaged, impairment in the 
cognitive control of emotion is observed, as well as an increase in emotional reactivity 
- two sides of the same coin. A question that is pertinent here is: which are the specific 
cognitive control processes that, when impaired, compromise emotion regulation? In 
this regard, evidence from lesion studies suggests that deficits in inhibition are the 
most common neuropsychological impairment associated to the disruption of emotion 
regulation. Falquez and colleagues (2015), for example, reported that deficits in 
go/no-go tasks are associated to a higher frequency of use of maladaptative emotion 
regulation strategies (e.g. rumination, catastrophizing). Furthermore, inhibition 
impairments have also been related to difficulties in implementing two specific types 
of emotion regulation strategy: suppression (the voluntary inhibition of prepotent 
emotional reactions, Salas et al., 2016) and reappraisal (the positive re-interpretation 
of negative events, Salas, Gross & Turnbull, 2014; Falquez et al., 2014). Another 
neuropsychological process that has been proposed as having a role in the regulation 
of emotional responses is verbal fluency. In-depth case studies, and lesion studies, 
have reported that verbal fluency impairment, often observed after left PFC damage, 
is associated to an increased difficulty in generating positive re-interpretations of 
negative events (Salas, Gross & Turnbull, 2014; Salas et al., 2013, 2014). Overall, it 
appears that there is some evidence to support inhibition and verbal fluency as key 
neuropsychological processes in the voluntary regulation of emotion. Such findings 
are consistent with behavioural and neuroimaging studies exploring the relationship 
between executive function and emotion regulation in normotypical individuals (for 
reviews see Schmeichel & Tang, 2015; Gross, 20014).   
 
6. Confabulation, positive emotions and emotion dysregulation. 
 
So far, evidence from studies of brain-injured individuals appears to support the idea 
that, when cognitive control (inhibition or verbal fluency) is compromised after 
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prefrontal damage, the influence of emotions on cognition and behaviour is enhanced. 
In this section we will address another aspect of this problem, which is the potential 
role that confabulations’ positive emotional state may have in perpetuating the 
imbalance between cognitive control and emotion.  
 
For those supporting the emotion dysregulation hypothesis, the core deficit is a 
deterioration of executive processes, especially as regards emotionally charged 
memories. Without this regulatory control, a normally present self-serving positive 
bias is exaggerated during retrieval, thus generating a disproportionately positive 
image of the self and its surrounding context (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
Fotopoulou, 2009, 2010; Fotopoulou, Conway, Solms et al., 2008, Turnbull et al, 
2004). The impact of the emotional subjective experience generated by a 
confabulation (the ‘disproportionately positive image’) is here interesting to consider 
in the light of a vast literature that has explored how positive and negative emotions 
shape cognition in general, and memory in particular. In this section we briefly 
mention three key findings, which are relevant to understand how the positive 
emotional state triggered by confabulation can perpetuate a pathological memory 
reconstructive loop.  
 
1. Positive emotions are related to more global or schematic forms of cognitive 
processing.  
It has been widely reported that the subjective emotional state of an individual can 
alter the way in which he/she processes information about the world or him/herself 
(Gasper & Clore, 2002; Solms & Turnbull, 2002; Panksepp, 1998). Evidence suggests 
that when individuals are in positive moods, they tend to rely more on general 
knowledge (or schemas). In contrast, negative moods lead to a conservative 
judgement that adheres more closely to the details of the information that is presented 
(for reviews see Bless & Schwartz, 1999; Forgas, 2002). In other words, positive 
emotion promotes a form of interpretative relational processing, where individuals 
tend to notice the more global characteristics, or the gist of an event, rather than the 
details (Clore et al., 2001; Fiedler, 2001; Kensinger, 2009). In contrast, negative 
emotion produces narrowed attention, and information processing becomes more 
detailed and stimulus bound (Clore & Storbeck, 2006; Schwarz, 1990, 2011; 351; 
425). 
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2. Positive emotions influence accuracy of memory recollection.  
In a similar fashion, it has also been reported that emotional valence has a differential 
impact in autobiographical memory (for a review see Holland & Kensinger, 2010). 
For example, positive events seem to come to mind more easily than negative ones 
(Levine & Bluck, 2004) - and when positive emotion is induced, individuals exhibit 
more intrusion errors, becoming less accurate in the reconstruction of memories, 
(Bless et al., 1996; Levine & Bluck, 2004; Park & Banaji, 2002). It appears that, when 
remembering positive events, people tend to ‘paint with broad strokes’, probably 
because positive memories are consistent with their goals, and do not require a critical 
evaluation – as is the case with memories of negative events (Levine & Bluck, 2004). 
This idea is consistent with the mood congruency framework of memory, which 
suggests that information which is congruent with people’s moods is more likely to be 
perceived, attended, stored, retrieved and considered when making judgements and 
decisions (for a review see Rusting, 1998; Bower & Cohen, 2014). Of particular 
interest for the problem of confabulation, some studies have reported that positive 
moods may lead to more reliable mood congruency memory than negative moods 
(Matt, Vasquez & Campbell, 1992; Rusting, 1998; Singer & Salovey, 1988). 
 
3. Positive emotions make people more susceptible to false memories.  
An important corollary of this valence effect to the problem of confabulation is that 
positive and negative emotions are differentially related to memory ‘malleability’, or 
the generation of false memories. Here, there is evidence suggesting that positive 
emotion is associated to a greater propensity for memory distortion than negative 
emotion (Baker-Ward, Eaton, Banks & 2005; Bohn & Berntsen, 2007; Levine & 
Bluck, 2004). People are more susceptible to false memories when in a pleasant state 
(Bless et al., 1996; Park & Banaji, 2000; Storbeck & Clore; 2005) while negative 
mood makes people more conservative in endorsing items that are related –but not 
identical- to studied items (Storbeck & Clore; 2005). Similarly, Kensinger and 
Schacter (2006) have noted that when an event is perceived as positive, there is a 
decrease in memory consistency and an increase in memory overconfidence.  
 
There is still debate regarding the relationship between emotional valence and 
susceptibility to false memories, with some studies claiming a similar effect for 
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negative emotions (Brainerd et al., 2008; Porter, Spencer & Birt, 2003). However, the 
relevance of this data to multifactorial models of confabulation appears undeniable. If 
confabulations place individuals in positive emotional scenarios, it is possible that the 
resulting subjective emotional state triggered by confabulations enhances even further 
the exaggeration of a positive self-serving bias. In other words, the positive emotional 
quality of confabulations can lead individuals to pay less attention to information that 
is incongruent with the activated positive self-schemas, or to accept more promptly 
information that is erroneous, but is consistent with the activated positive self-schema. 
In sum, the impact of positive emotions on cognition can compromise even further the 
inhibition and monitoring of false memories during retrieval (see Fig 1).  
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FIG 1. The Emotion Dysregulation Hypothesis and Confabulation. The figure 1a (top) describes the 
normal reconstructive process by which memories are retrieved. Here, there is balance between 
cognitive control and motivational influences in the reconstruction process, so the retrieved memories 
are influenced by normal positive self-bias and cognitive control mechanisms guarantee that there is 
correspondence with previous experience. Fig 1b (bottom) depicts a pathological retrieval where, due 
to impairment in cognitive control, a dysregulation of emotion influences in the reconstruction process 
takes place. As a consequence, memories that are coherent with a disproportionately positive image of 
the self, but do not correspond with previous experience, are retrieved and accepted as true 
[confabulation]. The positive subjective experience associated to confabulations influences information 
processing, and autobiographical memory retrieval, thus generating a pathological loop.  
 
 
 
7. The self-regulatory nature of memory reconstruction 
A core tenet of the emotion dysregulation hypothesis is that the process of 
autobiographical memory recollection has a reconstructive nature (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Fotopolou, 2009; 2010) and that the self is constantly re-
created as a consequence of such process. As noted by McAdams (2001), individuals 
actively remember and imagine autobiographical information in order to bring 
coherence and continuity to their selves. This idea has led some authors to propose 
that memory cannot be considered merely as a cognitive process, but as one that is 
central in the constitution and maintenance of the self: a Self-Memory System 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). From this point of view, the preservation of 
coherence, the agreement between a memory representation and the conceptual self 
(self-images, life story and beliefs), is a powerful influence in the memory 
reconstruction process (Conway & Loveday, 2015), one that is pathologically 
exacerbated in cases of confabulation.  
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Conway and colleagues’ ideas appear consistent with a view of memory as a self-
regulatory tool. In fact, the Self-Memory System does consider goals as influencing 
what memories are encoded or retrieved, but no direct reference is made to emotion 
regulation as a main goal. This contrasts, however, with evidence from studies 
exploring the influence that emotion has on memory processes. Here, it has been 
noted that memory reconstruction has a key role regulating emotions, since people 
can, more or less voluntarily, choose memories to modulate how they feel (Koole, 
2009; Holland & Kensinger, 2010; Pasupathi, 2003). In other words, the emotions that 
we want to feel (or do not want to feel) can influence the way we reconstruct past 
experiences (Holland & Kensinger, 2010). For example, individuals can recall 
positive memories in order to maintain positive moods (e.g. Joorman et al., 2004), or 
recall positive emotions in order to repair negative emotional states (e.g. Josephson, 
Singer & Salovey, 1996). 
 
 
 
8. Closing comments 
In this article we have attempted to conceptually develop a model of confabulation 
based on the so-called emotion (or affect) dysregulation hypothesis (Turnbull et al, 
2004; Fotopoulou, 2009; 2010). We have reviewed the traditional ‘cognitive’ and 
‘emotional’ accounts of confabulation, suggesting that a better understanding of the 
processes underlying confabulation can be reached by considering the interaction 
between cognitive and emotional factors. In fact, the central tenant of the emotional 
dysregulation hypothesis is that damage to memory retrieval inhibitory mechanisms 
interacts with abnormally enhanced motivational factors, resulting in the abnormal 
influence of these elements in the memory reconstructive process. We have 
contributed to this hypothesis by including another potentially relevant aspect to this 
model: the role that the emotionally positive experience of the confabulation may 
have in perpetuating a pathological cognitive-emotional loop. Here, evidence from 
studies exploring the influence that positive emotion has in cognition in general, and 
memory in particular, enriches the model.    
 
We have been able to sketch the issues that seem most central in understanding the 
potential emotion-related causes of confabulation. These are, firstly, that emotion 
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seems to play an important causative role in confabulation, though perhaps not an 
invariable one, as it may well act in concert with our factors, such as impaired 
executive function. Secondly, as regards mechanism, both the lesion site data, and the 
‘defensive’ content of many confabulations, suggest that the impaired psychological 
process is not that of basic emotions, but of emotion regulation. Thirdly, we have the 
prospect of identifying more specific psychological skills that are core to this process, 
such as impaired inhibition. Finally, we can frame the positive emotional bias seen in 
confabulation in the context of a more general (but more modest) bias seen in the 
neurologically normal. This perspective allows us to better understand confabulation 
as an exaggerated instance of a class of biased belief which is widely present – thus 
locating confabulation in the greater family of false belief disorders. It seems clear to 
us that a unified theory of such belief states is a necessary and worthy aspiration for 
the field, and we look forward to the role which confabulation might play in better 
understanding this important psychological phenomenon.     
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